Do migrants adopt new political attitudes from abroad? Evidence using a multi-sited exit-poll survey during the 2013 Malian elections by Lisa Chauvet et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Do migrants adopt new political attitudes
from abroad? Evidence using a multi-sited
exit-poll survey during the 2013 Malian
elections
Lisa Chauvet1,2,3, Flore Gubert1,4 and Sandrine Mesplé-Somps1*
* Correspondence: mesple@dial.prd.fr
1IRD, Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL
Research University, LEDa, UMR
[225], DIAL, 75016 Paris, France
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
In this article, we examine whether migration experience provides an opportunity for
Malian migrants to learn and adopt new political values and norms, and whether
this translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institutions. We
use a multi-sited exit-poll survey which was conducted during the Malian 2013
presidential election in Mali, France, and Côte d’Ivoire to investigate whether Malian
migrants have different perceptions and political behavior than their non-migrant
counterparts. By distinguishing between Malian migrants living in France and Côte
d’Ivoire, we provide evidence that not only migrants have different perceptions of
Malian democratic institutions than their non-migrant counterparts, but also that the
institutional context of the host country matters for the adoption of political norms.
Keywords: Migration, Social remittances, Political norms, Africa
Introduction
With remittances being now recognized as one of the main sources of external funding
for developing countries, most of the analyses investigating the relationship between
migration and development have focused on the financial returns of migration for
origin countries. However, the last 15 years have witnessed an increasing interest in
“social remittances”, that is the ideas, know-how, practices, and skills that are trans-
ferred by migrants from host to sending communities (Levitt, 1998, 2001). Closely tied
to the paradigm of transnationalism, social remittances are considered by some authors
as potentially having greater impacts on origin countries (see, e.g. Kapur & McHale,
2005; Kapur, 2010). Yet, the existing empirical evidence to support this assertion is still
limited, as the effects of the circulation of ideas, norms, and practices are hard to cap-
ture. One promising line of research in this field investigates the political changes in-
duced by migration. Contact with more democratic countries may indeed change
migrants’ political beliefs and practices, and migrants may in turn transfer these
newly-acquired political opinions to people in their origin countries when they return
home or via cross-border connections. By so doing, migrants have the potential to be
agents of change and help strengthen democracy in their home country (see, e.g.
Batista & Vicente, 2011).
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In this paper, we investigate whether migration experience provides an opportunity
for Malian migrants to learn and adopt new political values and norms, and whether
this translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institutions. Our
assumption is that thanks to migration, individuals are confronted to a new environ-
ment and are naturally led to ask themselves how their home country compares to
this new environment on various dimensions such as civil liberties, the functioning of
institutions, etc. Depending on the institutional quality of the country they reside in,
this comparison may be favorable or unfavorable to the home country and is likely to
influence the perceptions migrants have on domestic political institutions. As a result,
their perceptions should be different from the ones of non-migrants.
Our focus on Malian migrants is justified on two grounds: Mali’s migration patterns
on the one hand and Mali’s experience with democracy on the other hand. With
regards to the first point, Mali has a long-lasting history of migration both within the
African continent and to Europe. According to household survey data collected in
2011, about 328,400 Malians reside abroad and 1.2 million Malian residents have
undertaken at least one migration abroad over their lifetime out of a population of 15.9
million.1 As a result, 21 % of the Malian population aged 15 or more live in a house-
hold with at least one member abroad and 48.4 % in a household with at least one
return migrant from abroad (Chauvet, Gubert, & Mesplé-Somps, 2013; Sougane, 2015).
Most international migrants reside in neighboring Western African countries, with
Côte d’Ivoire being by far the main destination country.2 The colonial history of Mali,
as well as its geographical situation has also resulted in significant migration flows from
Mali to France since the end of the 1950s, and around 16 % of Malian migrants
currently reside in France (Chauvet et al., 2013). The size of the Malian diaspora, along
with the close links that it keeps with its origin country, has made of migration an im-
portant phenomenon for the Malian society.
Turning to political issues, the situation of Mali has drastically evolved over the past
years. Having had elected representatives at the national and local levels for 20 years,
Mali was considered an example of smooth and successful transition to democracy.3
This vision lasted until March 22, 2012 when a coup d’état followed by an armed
conflict with ethnic separatists and religious extremists in the Northern part of the ter-
ritory endangered Mali’s political system.4 Since then, the country has been considered
as a fragile democracy. In terms of electoral participation, voter turnout has increased
over the past 15 years from slightly less than 30 % in the 1997 presidential election to
around 50 % in 2013. Participation rates remain low, though, which contrasts with the
impressive number of political parties. In 2009, no less than one hundred parties partic-
ipated to the local election. However, this high fragmentation hides the domination of
the Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) over the Malian political life for
more than a decade. With regards external voting, Mali has granted voting rights to its
citizens living abroad since 1991. Considerably lower than the internal voter turnout,
the external voter turnout was 19.3 % in 2007, but increased up to 44.6 % in 2013
(Dedieu, 2013). This rise, which could have been even higher if the registration process
had been simplified, illustrates the potentially important role played by Malian migrants
in the political life of their origin country.
In order to assess whether migration experience translates into different attitudes
towards domestic politics and institution, we draw on original data from the project
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“Political Impact of Migration” (POLECOMI). These data were collected through
multi-sited election exit polls during the last Malian presidential elections, in July 2013,
that is to say once democratic institutions have been restored after the coup of 2012.
The survey was designed so as to have three teams of surveyors in France, Côte
d’Ivoire, and Mali, all of them interviewing Malian voters exiting polling places the day
of the first round of the elections. Among destination countries, France was chosen for
being a competitive multiparty democracy, by contrast to Côte d’Ivoire which is gener-
ally considered as a defective democracy.5 France and Côte d’Ivoire are also the main
destination countries for Malian migrants, respectively in Europe and Africa. While the
tradition of migration among the Malian population goes back to the precolonial
period, the bulk of migration from Mali to Côte d’Ivoire and France occurred during
the 1960s and 1970s due to the huge expansion of cocoa and coffee plantations in Côte
d’Ivoire that need a lot of agricultural laborers, and to the demand of labor force of the
manufacturing sector in France. At that period, migration flows to France were mainly
composed of individuals coming from the region of Kayes, located in the Western part
of the country, and belonging to the Soninke ethnic group (Gubert, 2000) whereas
migrants to Côte d’Ivoire were originated from the South part of Mali (Sikasso region).
While migration to these both countries has evolved and now includes individuals from
other regions and ethnic backgrounds, the Kayes area and the South part of Mali
remain the main regions of origin of Malian migrants.
We find that Malian migrants display different political attitudes than their fellow
non-migrant counterparts in Mali. More specifically, we find that their perceptions on
Malian democracy and institutions differ from Malian non-migrants. Their interest for
politics and their implication in political matters are also affected by their migration
experience. Moreover, the extent to which Malian migrants trust (or distrust) the
institutions of their home country and the interest they have for Malian political life
are found to depend on the country they reside in.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the literature on social remittances and discuss the existing evidence on
the relationship between migration experience and migrants’ political attitudes. In
Section 3, we present the exit poll data collected in the framework of the POLECOMI
project, and describe our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and provides
some suggestive evidence on the channels that could drive our results. Section 5
concludes.
Literature review
There is now an abundant literature exploring the many ways and means migration
impacts on origin countries. The most widely explored dimension of migration is
migrants’ financial remittances. As the second largest source of external funding for
developing countries, remittances have been recognized as supplementing the incomes
of millions of poor families and significantly contributing to reduce poverty. However,
remittances in cash or goods are not the only links between migrants and their families
of origin. As underlined by Peggy Levitt in her 2001 book, The Transnational Villagers,
migrants also facilitate the cross-border diffusion of ideas, identities, beliefs, knowledge,
and behavior which are now commonly referred to as social remittances. The latter
circulate in several ways: through phone calls, letters, or the internet; when migrants
Chauvet et al. Comparative Migration Studies  (2016) 4:19 Page 3 of 31
return to their homeland; or when conversely non-migrants come to visit their friends
or parents in their country of residence.
Drawing upon Levitt’s conceptual framework, several recent papers have investigated
the issue of international migration as a channel for the diffusion of fertility norms
(see, e.g., Lindstrom & Saucedo, 2002; Fargues, 2007; Beine, Docquier & Schiff, 2013;
Beine & Sekkat, 2013; Bertoli & Marchetta, 2015). Other authors have examined the
spillover effects of migration in terms of health knowledge (see, e.g., Lindstrom &
Munoz-Franco, 2006; Hildebrandt & McKenzie, 2005; Holdaway, Levitt, Fang, &
Rajaram, 2015). With regards to political norms or ideas, the question of whether mi-
gration is one of the possible ways through which the diffusion of democracy might
take place has for a long time been mostly debated in the transnational literature at the
theoretical level and illustrated using specific migrants communities experiences (see, e.g.,
Levitt, 2001; Morawska, 2002; Camp, 2003; Lauth & Pickel, 2009 cited by Rüland, Kessler,
& Rother, 2009; Dedieu, Chauvet, Gubert, Mesplé-Somps & Smith, 2013). It is only re-
cently that some quantitative analyses have been carried out.
Among economists, the diffusion of political norms has first been tested at the macroeco-
nomic level (Li & McHale, 2006; Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport, & Schiff,
2011; Beine & Sekkat, 2013; Lodigiani & Salomone, 2012). Overall, these studies find that
openness to emigration has a positive effect on home-country institutional development.
However, they do not allow to properly identifying the mechanisms at work, and only men-
tion the home countries’ increased exposure to new political values and practices thanks to
contacts with return migrants and relatives abroad as one possible channel. To some extent,
the same holds true with micro studies using data on electoral outcomes (Mahmoud, Rapo-
port, Steinmayr, & Trebesch, 2013; Pfutze, 2012; Chauvet & Mercier, 2014; Batista, Seither
& Vicente, 2014): overall, they find that electoral outcomes vary depending on the intensity
of migration or return migration at the locality level, without being fully certain if this result
can be interpreted as evidence of a diffusion of political norms and ideas by the migrants.6
One exception is Batista and Vicente (2011) who use a voting experiment and an instru-
mental variable strategy to show that international migration promotes better institutions at
home by raising the demand for political accountability. The authors also show that this im-
pact depends on which destination country migrants reside in (Portugal or United States).
One of the common underlying assumptions on which rest all these papers is that
migration has the potential to alter or to strengthen migrants’ political attitudes
towards a more democratic direction. Indeed, a prerequisite for migrants to act as
agents of change by channeling novel political beliefs and practices from their host
country to their country of origin is that they themselves have had their beliefs and
attitudes altered by their migration experience in the first place. As argued by Levitt
(1998), however, not all migrants necessary absorb all ideas in the same way, and the
degree to which migrants’ attitudes are altered depends upon their interaction with the
host society.
Following her contribution, a few authors have investigated whether contact with
more democratic contexts through migration translates into democratic political attitudes
in other contexts. Using data on a random sample of 650 voting-age Mexican citizens,
Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) estimate multi-level logistic and linear regres-
sions of political participation and attitudes on a set of individual characteristics
including a variable of migration experience. They find that having lived abroad, in
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the United States or in Canada, makes respondents more tolerant and more critical of
the Mexican government’ record on rights than their counterparts who have never
lived abroad. But the rate of political participation of returnees is found to be indistin-
guishable from that of other Mexicans. In the framework of a research project entitled
“Democratisation through migration?”, Rother (2009) conducts the same kind of ana-
lysis on Filipino migrants. However, the investigation is pushed a little bit further than
in Pérez-Amendáriz and Crow (2009) through a comparison of former Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs), coming back from various countries selected for being
either democratic or authoritarian, with OFWs awaiting for their departure. The
results suggest significant variation in the esteem returnees have for democratic
values, personal freedom, labor rights, etc., depending on the country they come
from. Those who personally benefited from the provision of rights relating to their
situation during their stay (as is the case for OFWs who were in Hong-Kong) are
found to be in higher agreement with democratic values than those who did not. In a
similar vein, Careja and Emmenegger (2012) use data collected in 2002 among more
than 10,000 individuals residing in Central and Eastern European countries to explore
whether migrants returning from Western countries display different political atti-
tudes than their fellow non-migrant citizens. They find a differentiated relationship
between migration and political attitudes: while migrants and non-migrants show the
same attitudes toward domestic politics, the two groups are found to differ with
respect to their political participation, their satisfaction with how democracy works,
and their interest for EU and foreign policy matters, with migrants participating more,
being more satisfied, and more interested in politics than non-migrants. Moreover,
only migration to established democracies is found to have a visible effect.
In sum, the existing evidence suggests that migration experience may contribute to
shape migrants’ political attitudes, in a way that has been found to depend on several
factors. A strong limitation of this literature, however, is that endogeneity issues, while
generally acknowledged, are not always properly dealt with. Some less democratic destina-
tions may attract individuals who care less for democracy. More generally speaking,
individuals may move abroad, because of their preference for democracy in the first place.
Not taking this possibility into account may result in an over-estimation of the role of
migration in shaping political attitudes. Our aim in this paper is thus to explore the
impact of migration experience on migrants’ political attitudes using an instrumentation
strategy that correct for endogeneity. We do so with data on an African diaspora that, to
our knowledge, has attracted little attention so far.
Data and empirical strategy
For the purpose of this research, we collected an original dataset on Malian voters
interviewed in Mali, France, and Côte d’Ivoire during the first round of the last presi-
dential election on July 28, 2013.7 To this end, we put in place multi-sited exit polls in
different places: three suburbs of Paris (France), namely Bagnolet, Montreuil and Evry8;
three communes located in the Northern part of Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), namely
Abobo, Adjamé and Attécoubé; three localities in the region of Kayes - Kayes, Kenieba
and Kita; and the communes I, IV and VI of Bamako (Mali).9 The choice of France and
Côte d’Ivoire was driven by the fact that both are the main destination countries of
Malian migrants, respectively in Europe and Africa. The focus on the capital cities and
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their suburbs was justified by the density of Malian migrants and polling stations in
these localities, which facilitated the fieldwork and allowed us to interview large
numbers of migrants in only one day. In Mali, we targeted the capital city of Bamako,
as well as some localities in the Kayes region because a majority of Malian migrants to
France originates from these places. Moreover, we restricted the sample to cities and
did not sample polling stations in rural areas to facilitate the supervision of the
fieldwork.
The multi-sited exit polls were conceived so as to be perfectly comparable across
countries. The survey includes a core questionnaire with the same questions asked to
all respondents, independently of their country or place of residence, as well as specific
additional modules for migrants and non-migrants. The core questionnaire includes
modules on respondents’ main characteristics, perception on Malian democracy and
institutions, and interest for politics and political activities in Mali. Interviewees in
France and Côte d’Ivoire had to answer additional modules on their perception on
democracy and institutions in their host country, their political activities in the host
country, and their connections with their homeland. Interviewees in Mali had to
answer additional modules on their past migration experience (if ever), and their
connections with members of their household living abroad.
The final sample used in our analyses is composed of 188 Malian voters in France,
225 in Côte d’Ivoire, and 658 in Mali (with 338 and 320 voters being respectively
interviewed in Bamako and Kayes). Since our objective is to compare migrants to
non-migrants, individuals with a past migration experience, i.e. returnees, in the sample
of Malians interviewed either in Bamako or Kayes are excluded from our analyses.10
In order to assess the impact of migration experience on migrants’ political attitudes,
we estimate the following general model:
POLITICALi ¼ α þ βXi þ δMIGRANTi þ εi
where POLITICALi is meant to capture various dimensions of individual i’s political
attitudes and perceptions of Malian institutions. Xi, is a set of individual i’s characteris-
tics and MIGRANTi, is our variable of interest which indicates whether individual i is
currently living in France or in Côte d’Ivoire.
We assess the impact of migration on various dimensions of political attitudes and
perceptions by estimating the model using 11 alternative dependent variables. The re-
spondents’ perception of Malian institutions is captured by the question of whether
they tend to trust certain institutions including democracy (DEMOCi), politicians be-
fore the coup (POLITICi), politicians after the coup (POLITIC2i), justice (JUSTICEi),
the police (POLICEi), the media (MEDIAi), and the army (ARMYi). Answers are coded
on a 4-point scale ranging from “I fully trust” (coded 1) to “I do not trust at all” (coded
4). We dichotomize the variables, with 1 indicating “full trust” and 0 otherwise.
Interest in politics is captured by four different variables: the first one is a dummy
variable equal to one if the respondent declares having a strong interest for Malian
politics (INTERESTi); the second variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the
respondent had a strong interest for Malian 2013 elections (INTEREST2013i). Finally,
the last two variables are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the respondent is close
to a political party in Mali (CLOSEPOLi) and if he is a member of a political party in
Mali (MEMBERPOLi).
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Perceptions and interest in politics may be differently influenced by migration experi-
ence depending on the institutional context and media prevailing in the destination
country. In order to capture these differences, we distinguish between migrants living
in France MIGFRANCEi, and migrants in Côte d’Ivoire, MIGIVOIREi. These two
variables are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the respondent was surveyed in
France and Côte d’Ivoire respectively (0 otherwise).
Last, the set of control variables, Xi, includes the respondents’ main characteristics
that are likely to influence their perceptions and interest in politics. These variables
are age, sex, ethnic group, education and region of birth.11 Controlling for these indi-
vidual characteristics is important because they may not only explain differences in
the political attitudes of the respondents, but also be correlated with their propensity
to migrate and their destination choice: in this case, omitting them from the model
would bias the estimated impact of migration on political attitudes. The propensity to
migrate has indeed been shown to be strongly dependent on individual characteristics
such as age or education. In the case of Mali, it is also determined by ethnicity and
region of birth: as it has been said before, the Soninke originating from the Kayes
region, in Western Mali, have a long-lasting tradition of migration to France while those
coming from the Southern part of Mali (Sikasso region) are strongly over-represented in
the migration flows to Côte d’Ivoire.
Controlling for age, education, ethnicity and region of birth may not be sufficient,
though, to preclude any bias in the estimation of the coefficient of the migration
variables. Malian migrants may indeed have some specific unobservable attributes, such
as risk aversion, entrepreneurial mindset or, say, a preference for democracy, which
may both affect their probability to leave Mali and their political attitudes. In that case,
the estimated coefficients of MIGFRANCEi and MIGIVOIREi would be plagued by
endogeneity. We therefore implement an identification strategy in which MIGFRANCEi
and MIGIVOIREi are instrumented by macroeconomic variables from the destination
country that are unlikely to be correlated with political attitudes and perceptions, but
are strongly correlated with migration status. For the emigration decision to France, we
use the annual percentage growth rate of France’s nominal GDP per capita12 since this
variable is likely to provide a good indicator of the demand for workers, be they
nationals or foreigners, and thus act as a pull factor among Malian migrant candidates.
Following Wahba (2015), we use the growth rate of France’s nominal GDP per capita
when the individual is 24 years old, which is the average age at the time of departure
for our sample of migrants. For the emigration decision to Côte d’Ivoire and given that
the survey took place in the capital city of Abidjan, we use the annual number of
fatalities due to civil or social conflicts in Abidjan when the individual is 24 years old as
a potential deterrent to migration to Côte d’Ivoire (see a description of the data in
ACLED 2013. In both first-stage estimations, we also use a dummy variable indicating
whether the respondent is the household head (HEADi) as an additional instrument for
our migration variables. For comparison purposes, we finally use alternatively ordinary
least square estimators (OLS) and two stage least squares models (2SLS).13
Our estimations are run on three different sub-samples. We first compare Malian
migrants living in France to non-migrants in Mali (excluding returnees). We then
compare Malian migrants living in Côte d’Ivoire to non-migrants in Mali (again excluding
returnees). Finally, we compare migrants in France and in Côte d’Ivoire to non-migrants.
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This last specification on the whole sample (excluding returnees) allows us to compare
the coefficients estimated for each migrant category directly and to see whether migrants
in France and migrants in Côte d’Ivoire differ significantly in terms of their political atti-
tudes. As in the previous specifications, both OLS and 2SLS are alternatively used. How-
ever, when both migration variables are included simultaneously, the instruments perform
poorly which leads us to present the results using the OLS estimator only.14
Whatever their country of residence, migrants are found to share some specific char-
acteristics that distinguish them from their non-migrant counterparts: they are indeed
more males, older, and less educated on average (detailed statistics are provided in Ap-
pendix, Table A1). As an illustration, while 24 % of the non-migrants have achieved ter-
tiary education, this is only so for 17 and 7 % of the migrants in France and Côte
d’Ivoire respectively. The same holds true for secondary education. As a result, the
share of individuals who never went to school is much higher among migrants than
among non-migrants, and especially so for migrants in Côte d’Ivoire.15
Turning to our dependent variables, Table 1 suggests that apart from a few excep-
tions, migrants in Côte d’Ivoire are characterized by higher levels of trust in Malian in-
stitutions than their non-migrant counterparts, while the reverse holds true for
migrants in France. This stands as an indication that migration experience affects the
political attitudes of migrants in ways that vary depending on the institutional environ-
ment prevailing in the host country. It may also indicate that more skeptical individuals
favor migrating to France rather than to Côte d’Ivoire. Less clear patterns emerge from
the variables aimed at capturing interest in politics. Overall, migrants are found to be
on average more interested in Malian politics than their non-migrant counterparts, but
are no more likely to be close to a Malian political party and less likely to be members
of a Malian political party, which may reflect the difficulties of being actively involved
in long-distance politics. However, before drawing strong conclusions, it is worthwhile
testing whether these findings hold when controlling for the respondents’ socioeco-
nomic characteristics.
Results
Estimation results are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2 (respectively Table 3) dis-
plays the results of the regressions of our eleven dependent variables on a dummy vari-
able for whether the respondent is a migrant in France (resp. Côte d’Ivoire). In both
cases, the comparison group is made of the sampled non-migrants after excluding re-
turnees. Table 4 displays the results of the regressions of the same set of outcome vari-
ables on two dummy variables for whether the respondent is a migrant in France or a
migrant in Côte d’Ivoire using non-migrants as the comparison group. In each table,
Panel A displays the regression results obtained after OLS estimations. In Tables 2 and
3, Panel B displays the regression results obtained after two-stage least squares estima-
tions. Columns (1) to (7) show the estimated impact of migration experience on the
level of trust in Malian institutions, while columns (8) to (11) show the estimated im-
pact of migration experience on interest in domestic politics.16
Overall, the results suggest that respondents interviewed in France are characterized
by lower levels of trust in Malian institutions than their non-migrant counterparts: the
coefficient of the migration variable is negative in six out of seven regressions (see col-
umns (1) to (7)) and significantly different from zero in five out of seven regressions.
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More importantly, most of these results hold after instrumenting MIGFRANCEi, and
the size of the coefficients slightly increases (Panel B), except for trust in the police
(col. (5)) and in the media (col. (6)). However, whatever the specification, migration
experience is found to affect neither trust in Malian democracy (col. (1)) or in Malian
politicians before the coup d’état (col. (2).
As regards interest in politics (columns (8) to (11)), migrants in France are found to
be more interested in Malian politics in general and to have had more interest for the
2013 presidential elections than their non-migrant counterparts, but this result should
be considered with caution since it does not hold when we account for the endogeneity
of MIGFRANCE.
If we now turn to migrants in Côte d’Ivoire, we find contrasted results. Panel A of
Table 3 shows indeed that when compared with their non-migrant counterparts, re-
spondents interviewed in Côte d’Ivoire have higher levels of trust in Malian democracy
and in various Malian institutions including justice and the police while at the same
time having a lower level of trust in the army. However, once instrumented, migration










High level of trust in… (Yes = 1)
Malian democracy DEMOCi 0.21 0.24 0.43 0.26
(0.41) (0.43) (0.50) (0.44)
Malian politicians POLITICi 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.16
(before coup) (0.33) (0.33) (0.45) (0.36)
Malian politicians POLITIC2i 0.34 0.15 0.37 0.32
(after coup) (0.48) (0.36) (0.48) (0.47)
Malian justice JUSTICEi 0.17 0.10 0.31 0.19
(0.38) (0.31) (0.46) (0.39)
Malian police POLICEi 0.27 0.16 0.34 0.27
(0.45) (0.36) (0.47) (0.44)
Malian media MEDIAi 0.31 0.22 0.28 0.29
(0.46) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45)
Malian army ARMYi 0.43 0.26 0.33 0.38
(0.50) (0.44) (0.47) (0.49)
High interest in… (Yes = 1)
Malian politics INTERESTi 0.36 0.56 0.45 0.42
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Malian 2013 elections INTEREST2013i 0.72 0.80 0.56 0.70
(0.45) (0.40) (0.50) (0.46)
Close to a Malian political party CLOSEPOLi 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.58
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Member of a Malian political party MEMBERPOLi 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.30
(0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.46)
Number of observations 658 188 225 1070
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 2 Migrants in France vs. Non-migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)




Panel A – OLS
MIGFRANCEi
a 0.053 −0.031 −0.191 −0.069 −0.098 −0.106 −0.148 0.195 0.139 −0.003 −0.056
(1.33) (−0.95) (−4.32)*** (−1.93)* (−2.38)** (−2.44)** (−3.15)*** (4.24)*** (3.28)*** (−0.07) (−1.26)
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.016 0.069 0.036 0.059 0.060 0.056 0.075 0.040 0.042 0.034
Number of obs. 843 843 837 840 845 843 844 849 848 848 848
Panel B – Two-stage least squares
MIGFRANCEi
a 0.023 −0.113 −0.202 −0.171 −0.100 −0.147 −0.368 0.003 0.014 −0.161 −0.181
(0.22) (−1.28) (−1.65)* (−1.76)* (−0.90) (−1.25) (−2.86)*** (0.02) (0.12) (−1.26) (−1.49)
Underidentif. test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ident. Testa 62.163 62.693 59.240 62.325 62.462 61.918 62.410 63.731 63.244 63.443 62.878
Sargan (p-value) 0.728 0.996 0.966 0.091 0.278 0.698 0.755 0.271 0.848 0.390 0.688
Number of obs. 843 843 837 840 845 843 844 849 848 848 848
(1) The reference category is “Being a non-migrant”
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Student’s t in parentheses
Additional controls include sex, ethnic groups, regions of birth, age and education variables. The list of instruments includes a dummy variable for whether the individual is the household head and real GDP per capita
growth in France for when the individual was 24 years old (24 years-old, source: World Bank, 2015)














Table 3 Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire vs. Non-migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






Panel A – OLS
MIGIVOIREi
a 0.257 0.159 0.036 0.129 0.126 0.029 −0.082 0.110 −0.157 0.019 −0.023
(6.02)*** (4.34)*** (0.79) (3.21)*** (2.78)*** (0.64) (−1.68)* (2.41)** (−3.58)*** (0.42) (−0.55)
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.053 0.032 0.047 0.039 0.039 0.050 0.051 0.078 0.042 0.060
Number of obs. 902 901 915 889 889 889 893 933 927 934 930
Panel A – Two-stage least squares
MIGIVOIREi
a 0.234 0.141 −0.098 0.091 0.220 0.095 −0.311 −0.248 −0.250 −0.040 −0.110
(1.86)* (1.32) (−0.72) (0.77) (1.61) (0.70) (−2.14)** (−1.77)* (−2.00)** (−0.29) (−0.87)
Underidentif. test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ident. Testa 55.606 55.682 56.255 55.267 51.814 52.386 54.637 55.904 61.480 57.415 56.104
Sargan test (p value) 0.487 0.396 0.704 0.148 0.231 0.899 0.282 0.505 0.367 0.773 0.216
Number of obs. 902 901 915 889 889 889 893 933 927 934 930
(1) The reference category is “Being a non-migrant”
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Student’s t in parentheses
Additional controls include sex, ethnic groups, regions of birth, age and education variables. The list of instruments includes a dummy variable for whether the individual is the household head and the number of
fatalities due to civil or social conflicts in Abidjan for when the individual is 24 years old (source: ACLED 2013)














Table 4 Migrants in France and in Côte d’Ivoire vs. Non-migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)






Panel A – OLS
MIGFRANCEi
a 0.052 −0.028 −0.206 −0.074 −0.098 −0.103 −0.146 0.183 0.135 0.001 −0.057
(1.27) (−0.82) (−4.69)*** (−2.01)** (−2.38)** (−2.43)** (−3.23)*** (4.09)*** (3.18)*** (0.02) (−1.37)
MIGIVOIREi
a 0.247 0.147 0.029 0.123 0.123 0.031 −0.096 0.124 −0.168 0.035 −0.039
(5.99)*** (4.24)*** (0.68) (3.29)*** (2.91)*** (0.71) (−2.08)** (2.83)*** (−4.03)*** (0.79) (−0.96)
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.043 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.043 0.051 0.067 0.071 0.039 0.052
Number of obs. 1,086 1,085 1,093 1,070 1,075 1,073 1,078 1,123 1,116 1,123 1,119
aThe reference category is “Being a non migrant”
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Student’s t in parentheses














experience is no more significant, except in columns (1) and (7). This suggests that
respondents in Côte d’Ivoire tend to be more satisfied with the way democracy works
in their home country than their non-migrant counterparts (col. (1)), while at the same
time distrusting more the army (col. (7)). This last finding is the only one that is
common to migrants in France and migrants in Côte d’Ivoire. Most of the other results
suggest that not every migration experience affects the political attitudes of migrants in
significant ways. Last, columns (8) to (11) of Panel B suggest that migrants in Côte
d’Ivoire are less interested and less involved in Malian politics than their non-migrant
counterparts. Overall, our findings for migrants in France and Côte d’Ivoire are very
much in line with those of other papers (see, among others, Batista & Vicente, 2011;
Careja & Emmenegger, 2012). As for us, but using behavioral data collected in the
migrant home country, namely Cape Verde, Batista and Vicente find that political
attitudes are transferred by current and return migrants to residents in the home
country with an intensity that depends on the countries of migrant destination. More
precisely, they find that only emigrants to the US seem to have a sizable and
significant impact on the desire for better governance. By contrast, the effects of
emigrants to Portugal are not statistically significant.
Finally, the results relating to the control variables are displayed in Tables A2 and A3
in Appendix. Table A2 provides the 2SLS estimates obtained on the sample composed
of migrants in France and non-migrants, while Table A3 provides the 2SLS estimates
obtained on the sample composed of migrants in Côte d’Ivoire and non-migrants.
Overall, the results suggest that male respondents are more interested in Malian politics
and have higher levels of trust in Malian institutions than their female counterparts. But
the coefficient is only significant in one out of 11 regressions in Table A2 and in two
out of 11 regressions in Table A3. In both models, education is found to be positively
correlated with individuals’ interest in politics: educated individuals are indeed more
likely to declare being close to or member of a Malian political party than individuals
with no education. With regards to their perceptions of Malian institutions, by
contrast, highly educated individuals do not significantly differ in terms of trust, ex-
cept for the army that they distrust much more than their non-educated counterparts.
No clear pattern emerges from the other control variables. Age and ethnicity in particular
tend to have no effect on our outcome variables (with a few exceptions), whereas people
coming from some regions (Kayes particularly) seem to have different degree of trust in
the Malian institutions than the natives of Bamako (the reference category).
Finally, Table 4 displays the results of the regressions of the same set of outcome
variables on two dummy variables for whether the respondent is a migrant in France or
in Côte d’Ivoire using non-migrants as the comparison group. This last table is meant
to go further in the understanding of the way the political and institutional context
prevailing in the host country affects migrants’ perceptions and interest in domestic
politics. Because of a weak instrument problem, only OLS results are shown, which
points to a need for caution in interpreting them. Overall, the results of Table 4 are in line
with those of Tables 2 and 3. Migrants in France are found to be much more distrustful
towards Malian institutions - especially regarding justice and police - than their Ivoirian
and non-migrant counterparts and much more interested in Malian politics.
The above results suggest that migrant voters have different political attitudes and
perceptions than their non-migrant counterparts, and that the differences depend on
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the country they reside in. This suggests in turn that the institutional characteristics of
the country of destination matter.
As suggested by Levitt (1998), changes in individual political attitudes and percep-
tions also depend on the capacity and willingness of the migrants themselves to learn
and adopt the values and norms of their host country. The degree to which their
initial beliefs and ideas are altered is a function of their interaction with the host
country’s population which is likely to vary depending on their socio-economic
characteristics and the cultural distance between them and the host society.17 An-
other channel through which migration might induce changes in political beliefs
relates to the economic improvement it brings to migrants. Indeed, when individuals
increase their personal economic resources in migration, they may be tempted to
adopt the values and ideas of the country that they perceived as being the source of
this expansion.
In order to see whether our data meet these assumptions, we compute simple de-
scriptive statistics to see whether and to what extent migrants’ appetite for democracy
and skepticism towards their home country institutions vary according to some of their
characteristics and the intensity of their interactions with the host society. As an indica-
tor of socialization with the host country, we use migrants’ host country media con-
sumption as the latter is expected to trigger the adoption of new values and ideas. We
also use a dummy variable for whether the migrant is a member of a trade union in the
host country. Being a union member suggests indeed that the migrant has assimilated,
that he is “politically incorporated” and that he has learnt the skills and commitments
of democratic citizenship. Turning to the migrants’ individual characteristics, we first
use their level of education as a proxy for both their income level and their capacity
and/or willingness to absorb news norms. Highly-educated migrants are expected to
better integrate in their new environment as it is easier for them to find a job. More-
over, the kind of job they get is likely to make them more exposed to the cultural
norms of their host country. Education is also likely to affect the composition of their
network which may comprise relatively more educated non-migrant individuals than in
the case of less-educated migrants. Finally, we characterize the place of residence of
migrants to approximate to what extent they live in ethnic clusters or not. More
precisely, for Malian migrants living in France – there is no equivalent in Côte
d’Ivoire – we account for whether the individuals live in a ‘foyer’. Almost one-fourth
of our sample of migrants in France is concerned. ‘Foyers’ are residences in which
migrants can rent a room (subsidized by the State) and share the facilities. This type
of infrastructure is meant to help isolated migrants settle when they arrive in France.
While it was meant as a temporary solution, the difficulty to find an alternative has
sometimes led migrants to live in ‘foyers’ for many years. Most of the time, ‘foyers’
gather migrants from the same origin country. It provides an information on how
isolated the migrants are – most of the time ‘foyers’ are meant for single men, without
their family – but also on how apart from the host population the migrants live.
Tables 5 and 6 provide, for each of our 11 measures of political attitudes and percep-
tions, its average value according to whether migrants in France (Table 5) and Côte
d’Ivoire (Table 6) get informed on French (respectively Ivoirian) political affairs by
watching TV, reading newspapers, or listening to the radio; have tertiary education; are
member of a union; and live in a foyer (for the French sample only).
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Table 5 Characteristics of migrants in France
Migrants in France














Does not live in
“foyer”
High level of trust in…
Malian democracy 0.21 0.22 0.31 0.06 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.25
(0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.25) (0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Malian politicians 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.10
(before the coup) (0.33) (0.30) (0.39) (0.18) (0.35) (0.35) (0.31) (0.41) (0.30)
Malian politicians 0.34 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.16
(after the coup) (0.48) (0.37) (0.34) (0.31) (0.37) (0.33) (0.38) (0.31) (0.37)
Malian Justice 0.17 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.09
(0.38) (0.22) (0.43) (0.00) (0.33) (0.29) (0.32) (0.37) (0.29)
Malian police 0.27 0.14 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.15
(0.45) (0.34) (0.41) (0.30) (0.37) (0.27) (0.41) (0.37) (0.36)
Malian media 0.31 0.20 0.28 0.06 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.21
(0.46) (0.40) (0.45) (0.25) (0.44) (0.37) (0.45) (0.45) (0.41)
Malian army 0.43 0.23 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.18 0.32 0.36 0.24
(0.50) (0.42) (0.48) (0.44) (0.44) (0.38) (0.47) (0.49) (0.43)
High interest in…
Malian politics 0.36 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.54 0.62 0.51 0.59 0.55
(0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Malian 2013 election 0.72 0.78 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.80














Table 5 Characteristics of migrants in France (Continued)
Close to a political party 0.59 0.53 0.63 0.69 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.51 0.57
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
Mb. of a political party 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.45 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.15 0.30
(0.47) (0.44) (0.46) (0.51) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45) (0.37) (0.46)
Number of observations 658 139 49 32 156 79 109 39 149
Standard deviations in parentheses
aMigrants who watch TV and/or read newspapers and/or listen to the radio or other media to get informed about French political affairs














Table 6 Characteristics of migrants in Côte d’Ivoire
Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire
Non migrants With access to media in
Côte d’Ivoirea
Without access to media
in Côte d’Ivoireb
With tertiary education Without tertiary education Union member Not a union member
High level of trust in…
Malian democracy 0.21 0.45 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.25 0.44
(0.41) (0.50) (0.49) (0.51) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50)
Malian politicians 0.13 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.29
(before the coup) (0.33) (0.46) (0.45) (0.00) (0.46) (0.29) (0.46)
Malian politicians 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.39
(after the coup) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.39) (0.49)
Malian Justice 0.17 0.34 0.28 0.07 0.33 0.09 0.32
(0.38) (0.47) (0.45) (0.26) (0.47) (0.30) (0.47)
Malian police 0.27 0.36 0.32 0.13 0.36 0.27 0.35
(0.45) (0.48) (0.47) (0.35) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
Malian media 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.13 0.29 0.09 0.30
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.35) (0.46) (0.30) (0.46)
Malian army 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.35 0.18 0.34
(0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.26) (0.48) (0.40) (0.47)
High interest in…
Malian politics 0.36 0.38 0.52 0.67 0.43 0.75 0.44
(0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50)
Malian 2013 election 0.72 0.53 0.58 0.93 0.53 0.75 0.55














Table 6 Characteristics of migrants in Côte d’Ivoire (Continued)
Close to a political party 0.59 0.53 0.63 0.93 0.56 0.75 0.57
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.26) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50)
Mb. of a political party 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.50 0.20
(0.47) (0.41) (0.41) (0.51) (0.40) (0.52) (0.40)
Number of observations 658 111 114 15 210 12 213
Standard deviations in parentheses
aMigrants who watch TV and/or read newspapers and/or listen to the radio or other media to get informed about Ivoirian political affairs














Interestingly enough, Table 5 first shows that 74 % (139 out of 188) of the migrants
interviewed in France “use” French media to get informed about politics in France.
Being exposed to French media is correlated to a stronger interest in French political
affairs together with a higher level of skepticism towards Malian institutions and politi-
cians and a lower interest in Malian politics, as shown by the differences in the means
of our variables of interest between the two sub-samples of migrants in France. The
same comparison between highly-educated migrants and less or no educated ones
shows a much higher skepticism towards Malian institutions in the former group than
in the latter one. As an illustration, only 6 % of the highly-educated migrants trust
Malian democracy, as compared to 28 % of the migrants with lower level of education.
Being highly-educated is also found to be associated with having a higher interest in
Malian politics, as well as a higher propensity to be close to, or a member of, a Malian
political party. The third proxy that we use to capture migrants’ level of interaction
with their host society is whether they are involved in some kind of activism through
membership to a union. Again, being a unionist is found to be associated with higher
skepticism towards Malian institutions.
The last dimension that we examine relates to the living conditions of Malians in
France. As expected, Malian migrants who do not live in a ‘foyer’ and are likely to
have more contact with the host society tend to be more distrustful towards Malian
institutions (especially justice and the army) and politicians than their counterparts
living in ‘foyer’.
In Table 6, we present similar descriptive statistics for Malian migrants living in
Côte d’Ivoire. Contrary to what is observed with migrants in France, getting informed
on Ivoirian political affairs via Ivoirian media does not make much of a difference in
terms of trust or distrust towards Malian institutions. This probably relates to the low
quality and low reliability of Ivoirian media especially since the start of the Ivoirian
political crisis. As a result, Ivoirian media do not really contribute to enhance
migrants’ free will and critical sense. By contrast, being highly-educated is, as for the
French sample, found to be key in illustrating how the assimilation of individuals to
their new environment may transform into the adoption of new political references.
While Malian migrants living in Côte d’Ivoire are found to be on average less
skeptical towards Malian institutions than their non-migrants counterparts, Table 6
shows that this is not true for the highly-educated ones whose perception of Malian
institutions is on average much more critical. Highly-educated Malian migrants living
in Côte d’Ivoire are also more interested in politics and more likely to be close to and
member of a political party. The same holds true for unionists.
Overall, the results of Tables 5 and 6 thus provide suggestive evidence that depending
on their personal attributes and living conditions, migrants are more or less likely to
actively adopt new norms while in migration. They underline that migration per se is
not enough to change opinions and behaviors. The degree of interaction and assimila-
tion in the host society is critical for this adoption of norms to occur.
Conclusion
In this article, we examine whether migration experience provides an opportunity for
Malian migrants to learn and adopt new political values and norms, and whether this
translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institutions. We use an
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original multi-sited exit-poll survey which was conducted during the Malian 2013
presidential election in Mali, France, and Côte d’Ivoire to investigate whether Malian
migrants have different perceptions and political behavior than their non-migrant
counterparts. By distinguishing between Malian migrants living in France and Côte
d’Ivoire, we provide evidence that non only migrants have different perceptions of
Malian democratic institutions than non-migrants, but also that the institutional
context of the host country matters for the adoption of political norms.
However, it is necessary to specify that our findings may overestimate the impact of
migration on political opinions and attitudes as our empirical study has been con-
ducted on a sample of voting migrants. They are probably more interested in politics
than those who did not go to vote. Finally, this paper does not exactly investigate how
powerful a mechanism migration is in the transmission of political norms but it
suggests that migration drives such a kind or social remittances by showing that
migrants’ political opinions are impacted by the institutional context of their host
countries.
Endnotes
1Migration is defined as having lived outside Mali more than six months.
2Three-fourths of the Malians living abroad live in Africa. Around 40 % of Malian mi-
grants live in Côte d’Ivoire (Chauvet et al., 2013).
3At least by the international community.
4For more detail on this event, see Thurston (2013), Wing (2013) or Whitehouse
(2012).
5France’s Polity IV score was +9 in 2014 while that of Côte d’Ivoire was +4 the same
year. Mali had a score of +7 until 2012 which has fallen to +4 since then. According to
the Centre for Systematic Peace in charge of the Polity IV Project, the Polity scores can be
converted into three regime categories : “autocracies” (−10 to −6), “anocracies” (−5 to +5)
and “democracies” (+6 to +10). (cf. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)
6Actually, other channels like an income effect induced by financial remittances may
come into play and interfere with the transfer of political norms.
7This election happened more than one year after the coup d’état and six months
after the establishment of a transitional government.
8The city of Bagnolet hosts the Malian consulate.
9All the surveys were designed and supervised by the authors of the paper. For each
survey, about ten investigators were involved. The field work were conducted in France
by the authors of the paper and Jean-Philippe Dedieu, in Côte d’Ivoire by Marion
Mercier and Anda David and in Mali by Arouna Sougane.
10These figures correspond to the number of fully-completed questionnaires, out of
a total of 1,333 interviews. 107 returnees were additionally excluded from our ana-
lyses. Comparing current and past migrants’ political attitudes as is done in Batista
and Vicente (2011) would have been of great interest here, but the number of
returnees from France and Côte d’Ivoire in our final sample was much too small
(respectively 7 and 51) to get any significant and reliable results. We thus decided to
drop them.
11Age is a categorical variable which distinguishes between the following age groups:
18–25, 25–35, 35–45, 45–60, 60–75, and 75 and more. We computed seven dummy
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variables relating to ethnic groups. The education variables were constructed using in-
formation on the highest class achieved. We distinguish between primary, secondary,
and tertiary education. In other regressions not shown here, we also included five
dummy variables respectively equal to one if the migrant belongs to the village head-
man’s family, the village’s founding family, the land chief ’s family, religious leader’s fam-
ily or a marabout’s family, but their overall contribution was not significantly different
from 0, so we opted for a more parsimonious set of regressors.
12Source: World Bank (2015).
13Non linear probit and IV probit models gave very similar results that are available
upon request.
14The first-step tests (under- and weak-identification) suggests indeed that our instru-
ments are too weak”to be trustworthy when MIGFRANCE and MIGIVOIRE are intro-
duced simultaneously.
15The statistics provided in Table A1 also reveal how selected our sample of voters is.
As an illustration, two thirds of the sampled (non-migrant) voters are men even though
women and men were equally represented among voters at the last presidential elec-
tions. This can be partly explained by higher refusal rates among female voters who
were asked to participate to our survey than among male voters. In a similar vein, the
share of highly educated individuals in our sample of non-migrants is found to be
much higher than the one observed in the general population. Part of this discrepancy
certainly results from the over-representation of highly-educated individuals among
voters. But a bias in favor of the highly-educated may also be present in our sample.
16Results of the first-stage equations are displayed in columns (1) and (2) of Table A4
in the Appendix. Being a migrant in France is found to be positively correlated with fa-
vorable macro conditions in France at the time of migration. Similarly, being a migrant
in Côte d’Ivoire is found to be negatively correlated with the level of insecurity prevail-
ing in Abidjan at the time of migration. Both migration variables are alsonegatively cor-
related with being the household head. Tests on the validity of the instruments (Sargan
test, under-identification test and weak identification test) are not rejected, which sug-
gests that our instruments are satisfactory.
17Using field work data collected in the city of Boston among Dominican migrants,
Levitt identifies three broad patterns of interaction, which result in differentiated
degree of attitudes alteration and of social remittance evolution. At one extreme are
recipient observers, defined as individuals who mostly interact with their country
fellows and take in new ideas and practices only by observing the world around
them, reading the papers, and watching television. Given the limited interactions of
the migrants with the host society, their norms and practices are therefore mainly
unaltered. At the other extreme are purposeful innovators, defined as individuals
who actively seek out new ideas, attitudes, and experiences. The migrants combine
their original norms and values with those acquired in their host countries, leading
through a cross-pollination to hybrid social norms (Levitt, 1998). Instrumental
adapters stand in-between, and are defined as individuals who pragmatically acquire
new skills and readjust their reference frame to better adapt to their new environ-
ment. Their original beliefs and values are unaltered by their migration experience,
but they acquire new norms that they “[add] to their cultural repertoire” (Levitt,
1998: 932).
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Appendix
Table 7 Respondents’ main socio-economic characteristics
Non migrants Migrants in France Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire All
Male 0.66 0.84 0.87 0.71
(0.47) (0.37) (0.34) (0.45)
Age category
[18–25] 0.27 0.03 0.09 0.19
(0.44) (0.18) (0.29) (0.39)
[25–35 [ 0.36 0.21 0.32 0.33
(0.48) (0.41) (0.47) (0.47)
[35–45 [ 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.24
(0.39) (0.49) (0.45) (0.43)
[45–60 [ 0.12 0.28 0.23 0.17
(0.32) (0.45) (0.42) (0.37)
[60–75 [ 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06
(0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24)
75 or more 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Level of education
None 0.19 0.33 0.56 0.29
(0.40) (0.47) (0.50) (0.46)
Primary 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45)
Secondary 0.29 0.21 0.10 0.23
(0.45) (0.41) (0.30) (0.42)
Tertiary 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.19
(0.42) (0.38) (0.25) (0.39)
Region of birth
Bamako 0.31 0.27 0.10 0.26
(0.46) (0.44) (0.30) (0.44)
Kayes 0.41 0.54 0.08 0.36
(0.49) (0.50) (0.28) (0.48)
Koulikoro 0.08 0.05 0.20 0.10
(0.28) (0.23) (0.40) (0.30)
Sikasso 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.07
(0.22) (0.13) (0.36) (0.25)
Segou 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07
(0.25) (0.23) (0.31) (0.26)
Mopti 0.04 0.01 0.23 0.08
(0.21) (0.07) (0.42) (0.27)
Gao/Mopti/Kidal 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
(0.13) (0.10) (0.20) (0.15)
Abroad 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.04
(0.12) (0.24) (0.29) (0.19)
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Table 7 Respondents’ main socio-economic characteristics (Continued)
Ethnicity (Mother’s tongue)
Bambara 0.54 0.37 0.33 0.46
(0.50) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50)
Malinke 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.14
(0.39) (0.16) (0.34) (0.35)
Peul 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06
(0.24) (0.21) (0.27) (0.25)
Sonraï/Djerma 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.19) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17)
Dogon 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.06
(0.16) (0.07) (0.39) (0.23)
Soninke 0.08 0.43 0.12 0.15
(0.27) (0.50) (0.33) (0.36)
Khassonke 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)
Other 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.08
(0.24) (0.25) (0.32) (0.26)
Number of observations 658 188 225 1070
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 8 Migrants in France vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
DEMOCi POLITICi POLITIC2i JUSTICEi POLICEi MEDIAi ARMYi INTERESTi INTEREST2013i CLOSEPOLi MEMBER POLi
MIGFRANCEi
(1) 0.023 −0.113 −0.202 −0.171 −0.100 −0.147 −0.368 0.003 0.014 −0.161 −0.181
(0.22) (−1.28) (−1.65)* (−1.76)* (−0.90) (−1.25) (−2.86)*** (0.02) (0.12) (−1.26) (−1.49)
Male −0.020 0.005 0.059 0.007 −0.029 0.010 0.047 0.107 0.022 0.065 0.047
(−0.60) (0.20) (1.63) (0.23) (−0.86) (0.28) (1.20) (2.75)*** (0.61) (1.63) (1.26)
Ethnicity (Mother’s tongue) [ref. is other]
Bambara −0.018 0.031 0.090 0.042 0.141 0.072 0.100 −0.022 0.022 −0.032 0.034
(−0.31) (0.64) (1.37) (0.78) (2.28)** (1.11) (1.41) (−0.31) (0.35) (−0.45) (0.51)
Malinke 0.044 0.004 0.121 0.050 0.106 0.086 0.132 0.006 0.052 0.019 0.036
(0.62) (0.08) (1.55) (0.78) (1.44) (1.11) (1.56) (0.07) (0.68) (0.22) (0.45)
Peul −0.004 −0.007 0.014 0.129 0.061 0.040 0.097 −0.118 0.088 −0.013 0.020
(−0.05) (−0.10) (0.16) (1.79)* (0.73) (0.45) (1.01) (−1.25) (1.02) (−0.14) (0.22)
Sonraï/Djerma 0.165 −0.041 0.022 0.099 0.184 0.103 0.118 −0.072 0.124 0.083 0.038
(1.52) (−0.47) (0.18) (1.01) (1.63) (0.87) (0.91) (−0.56) (1.05) (0.63) (0.30)
Dogon −0.044 0.001 0.008 0.056 −0.079 −0.038 0.208 0.039 0.003 0.103 0.055
(−0.37) (0.01) (0.06) (0.52) (−0.64) (−0.29) (1.47) (0.28) (0.03) (0.72) (0.41)
Soninke −0.036 0.073 −0.022 0.074 0.071 0.097 0.133 −0.092 0.002 0.010 0.082
(−0.47) (1.18) (−0.25) (1.08) (0.90) (1.17) (1.46) (−1.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.94)
Khassonke −0.126 −0.028 −0.096 −0.010 −0.106 −0.077 0.080 −0.220 −0.076 −0.135 0.015
(−1.04) (−0.28) (−0.71) (−0.09) (−0.84) (−0.58) (0.54) (−1.52) (−0.58) (−0.91) (0.10)
Age category [ref. is 18–25]
[25–35 [ −0.005 0.044 0.009 −0.029 −0.053 −0.009 −0.009 0.008 0.004 −0.038 0.026














Table 8 Migrants in France vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results (Continued)
[35–45 [ −0.061 0.054 0.060 0.011 −0.065 0.009 −0.040 0.139 −0.022 −0.016 0.072
(−1.17) (1.27) (1.05) (0.24) (−1.20) (0.16) (−0.65) (2.27)** (−0.39) (−0.25) (1.22)
[45–60 [ 0.081 0.067 −0.011 −0.047 −0.075 −0.057 −0.067 0.136 0.020 0.038 0.054
(1.39) (1.40) (−0.18) (−0.91) (−1.25) (−0.90) (−0.97) (1.98)** (0.32) (0.54) (0.81)
[60–75 [ 0.012 0.063 −0.021 −0.083 −0.072 0.059 −0.019 0.021 −0.119 −0.190 −0.007
(0.18) (1.09) (−0.27) (−1.31) (−0.99) (0.77) (−0.22) (0.25) (−1.57) (−2.24)** (−0.08)
75 and more −0.233 −0.111 −0.209 −0.210 −0.059 0.077 −0.060 0.022 −0.021 −0.182 0.265
(−1.49) (−0.86) (−1.21) (−1.39) (−0.36) (0.45) (−0.32) (0.12) (−0.12) (−0.96) (1.48)
Level of education [ref. is No education]
Primary 0.047 −0.000 −0.067 0.059 −0.034 0.034 −0.072 0.005 −0.053 0.142 0.094
(1.16) (−0.01) (−1.47) (1.62) (−0.79) (0.77) (−1.47) (0.10) (−1.21) (2.87)*** (2.02)**
Secondary 0.022 −0.018 −0.006 −0.035 −0.054 −0.011 −0.108 0.046 0.036 0.123 0.174
(0.51) (−0.50) (−0.12) (−0.91) (−1.21) (−0.24) (−2.08)** (0.90) (0.76) (2.35)** (3.52)***
Tertiary −0.030 −0.031 −0.069 −0.015 −0.017 −0.059 −0.108 0.129 0.065 0.122 0.166
(−0.66) (−0.82) (−1.34) (−0.37) (−0.35) (−1.17) (−1.96)* (2.36)** (1.30) (2.18)** (3.15)***
Region of birth [ref. Bamako]
Kayes −0.026 −0.020 0.074 0.032 0.119 0.142 0.099 0.063 0.007 0.013 0.056
(−0.72) (−0.68) (1.83)* (0.97) (3.16)*** (3.59)*** (2.29)** (1.46) (0.18) (0.30) (1.37)
Koulikoro −0.166 −0.072 0.021 −0.014 −0.039 −0.111 0.011 −0.103 0.049 −0.052 −0.053
(−2.86)*** (−1.52) (0.33) (−0.27) (−0.65) (−1.76)* (0.15) (−1.51) (0.79) (−0.75) (−0.80)
Sikasso −0.145 −0.104 −0.126 −0.038 −0.116 −0.031 −0.032 −0.137 0.074 −0.160 −0.050
(−1.96)* (−1.70)* (−1.54) (−0.56) (−1.50) (−0.38) (−0.36) (−1.55) (0.91) (−1.78)* (−0.59)
Segou −0.067 −0.039 0.041 0.033 0.057 0.057 0.089 −0.045 −0.033 −0.044 −0.067














Table 8 Migrants in France vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results (Continued)
Mopti −0.058 −0.047 0.114 −0.057 0.017 0.034 −0.142 −0.181 0.015 −0.054 −0.043
(−0.66) (−0.64) (1.16) (−0.72) (0.18) (0.35) (−1.33) (−1.71)* (0.15) (−0.50) (−0.42)
Gao/Mopti/ −0.389 −0.105 −0.097 −0.102 −0.027 −0.100 −0.071 0.043 0.044 −0.198 0.010
Kidal (−3.01)*** (−0.99) (−0.68) (−0.88) (−0.20) (−0.71) (−0.46) (0.28) (0.32) (−1.26) (0.06)
Abroad 0.040 0.028 0.177 0.155 0.058 0.136 0.123 0.023 0.051 0.079 −0.025
(0.41) (0.35) (1.65)* (1.77)* (0.58) (1.28) (1.06) (0.20) (0.48) (0.68) (−0.22)
Constant 0.266 0.117 0.232 0.144 0.216 0.201 0.391 0.262 0.677 0.511 0.128
(3.55)*** (1.91)* (2.80)*** (2.14)** (2.76)*** (2.45)** (4.36)*** (2.95)*** (8.35)*** (5.63)*** (1.50)
Underident. test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ident. Test(1) 62.163 62.693 59.240 62.325 62.462 61.918 62.410 63.731 63.244 63.443 62.878
Sargan (p value) 0.728 0.996 0.966 0.091 0.278 0.698 0.755 0.271 0.848 0.390 0.688
Number of obs. 843 843 837 840 845 843 844 849 848 848 848
(1) The reference category is “Being a non-migrant”
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01
The list of instruments includes a dummy variable for whether the individual is the household head and real GDP par capita growth in France for when the individual is 24 yearsold (source: World Bank, 2015).
(1) The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical value at 10 % is 19.93














Table 9 Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
DEMOCi POLITICi POLITIC2i JUSTICEi POLICEi MEDIAi ARMYi INTERESTi INTEREST2013i CLOSE POLi MEMBERPOLi
MIGIVOIREi
(1) 0.234 0.141 −0.098 0.091 0.220 0.095 −0.311 −0.248 −0.250 −0.040 −0.110
(1.86)* (1.32) (−0.72) (0.77) (1.61) (0.70) (−2.14)** (−1.77)* (−2.00)** (−0.29) (−0.87)
Male 0.006 0.012 0.081 0.017 −0.022 0.012 0.061 0.143 0.061 0.059 0.029
(0.17) (0.39) (2.04)** (0.49) (−0.57) (0.32) (1.46) (3.51)*** (1.63) (1.45) (0.78)
Ethnicity (Mother’s tongue) [ref. is other]
Bambara 0.034 0.043 0.055 0.047 0.116 0.069 0.085 0.011 0.056 −0.008 0.015
(0.60) (0.88) (0.88) (0.88) (1.91)* (1.13) (1.29) (0.18) (0.93) (−0.12) (0.26)
Malinke 0.085 0.040 0.091 0.025 0.056 0.051 0.115 0.017 0.071 0.070 0.021
(1.32) (0.73) (1.27) (0.42) (0.81) (0.73) (1.55) (0.23) (1.04) (0.98) (0.32)
Peul 0.075 −0.010 −0.043 0.135 0.039 0.081 0.134 −0.099 0.051 0.059 0.029
(0.99) (−0.16) (−0.52) (1.89)* (0.49) (0.99) (1.53) (−1.16) (0.65) (0.71) (0.38)
Sonraï/Djerma 0.209 −0.008 −0.039 0.078 0.183 0.098 0.076 0.017 0.109 0.082 0.027
(2.04)** (−0.09) (−0.34) (0.82) (1.69)* (0.90) (0.65) (0.14) (1.00) (0.70) (0.25)
Dogon 0.189 0.061 0.041 0.103 0.009 0.022 0.193 0.123 0.098 0.032 0.061
(2.09)** (0.79) (0.41) (1.18) (0.10) (0.22) (1.83)* (1.21) (1.04) (0.32) (0.67)
Soninke −0.026 0.013 0.010 −0.018 −0.029 −0.005 −0.013 −0.045 −0.108 −0.043 −0.010
−0.35) (0.20) (0.13) (−0.26) (−0.37) (−0.07) (−0.16) (−0.55) (−1.42) (−0.54) (−0.14)
Khassonke 0.102 0.085 −0.078 0.075 0.025 0.167 −0.003 −0.133 −0.117 −0.066 −0.096
(0.74) (0.73) (−0.52) (0.59) (0.17) (1.14) (−0.02) (−0.85) (−0.81) (−0.43) (−0.68)
Age category [ref. is 18–25]
[25–35] −0.013 0.017 0.034 −0.035 −0.037 −0.021 −0.021 −0.045 −0.045 −0.081 0.019














Table 9 Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results (Continued)
[35–45] −0.012 0.072 0.074 0.008 −0.050 0.041 −0.034 0.088 −0.026 −0.094 0.054
(−0.25) (1.85)* (1.48) (0.19) (−1.05) (0.85) (−0.65) (1.70)* (−0.53) (−1.85)* (1.17)
[45–60] −0.002 −0.011 0.025 −0.088 −0.096 −0.030 −0.122 0.112 −0.021 0.003 0.081
(−0.04) (−0.25) (0.44) (−1.79)* (−1.75)* (−0.55) (−2.05)** (1.88)* (−0.39) (0.06) (1.51)
[60–75] 0.025 0.008 0.042 −0.100 −0.101 0.023 −0.149 −0.044 −0.128 −0.181 0.007
(0.35) (0.13) (0.55) (−1.50) (−1.31) (0.29) (−1.84)* (−0.56) (−1.73)* (−2.34)** (0.10)
75 and more −0.233 −0.149 −0.301 −0.217 −0.287 0.033 −0.235 0.063 −0.030 −0.155 −0.002
(−1.67)* (−1.25) (−2.03)** (−1.67)* (−1.96)* (0.22) (−1.48) (0.41) (−0.21) (−1.02) (−0.02)
Level of education [ref. is No education]
Primary 0.081 0.020 −0.082 0.041 −0.026 0.062 −0.055 −0.067 0.010 0.113 0.133
(1.86)* (0.53) (−1.70)* (0.99) (−0.55) (1.31) (−1.09) (−1.32) (0.22) (2.27)** (2.94)***
Secondary 0.022 −0.014 −0.026 −0.047 −0.022 0.045 −0.119 −0.093 0.066 0.112 0.207
(0.39) (−0.29) (−0.42) (−0.89) (−0.37) (0.75) (−1.83)* (−1.40) (1.09) (1.73)* (3.48)***
Tertiary 0.015 −0.037 −0.092 −0.042 0.001 −0.009 −0.191 −0.004 0.105 0.097 0.151
(0.22) (−0.66) (−1.29) (−0.68) (0.02) (−0.12) (−2.50)** (−0.05) (1.54) (1.31) (2.22)**
Region of birth [ref. Bamako]
Kayes 0.023 0.024 0.062 0.036 0.167 0.169 0.131 0.023 −0.013 −0.003 0.060
(0.53) (0.66) (1.33) (0.89) (3.67)*** (3.67)*** (2.65)*** (0.48) (−0.29) (−0.05) (1.38)
Koulikoro −0.077 −0.052 −0.015 0.021 −0.012 −0.058 0.134 0.045 0.097 0.023 −0.026
(−1.25) (−0.98) (−0.23) (0.37) (−0.19) (−0.88) (1.91)* (0.65) (1.52) (0.34) (−0.41)
Sikasso 0.031 0.021 0.017 0.047 −0.015 0.035 0.159 0.098 0.094 −0.042 −0.022
(0.44) (0.35) (0.21) (0.71) (−0.19) (0.46) (1.94)* (1.22) (1.28) (−0.54) (−0.31)
Segou 0.052 0.005 0.086 0.024 0.046 0.051 0.147 0.015 0.033 −0.025 −0.062














Table 9 Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results (Continued)
Mopti −0.132 −0.028 0.088 −0.061 −0.023 −0.007 0.030 0.032 0.031 −0.011 −0.009
(−1.63) (−0.41) (0.99) (−0.80) (−0.27) (−0.08) (0.32) (0.35) (0.37) (−0.12) (−0.11)
Gao/Mopti/ −0.257 −0.120 −0.017 −0.066 −0.024 0.008 0.061 0.011 0.092 −0.173 −0.068
Kidal (−2.27)** (−1.24) (−0.14) (−0.61) (−0.20) (0.06) (0.47) (0.08) (0.77) (−1.36) (−0.58)
Abroad 0.022 0.015 0.157 0.149 −0.019 −0.029 0.199 0.219 0.076 0.111 0.009
(0.20) (0.17) (1.37) (1.47) (−0.17) (−0.25) (1.61) (1.85)* (0.71) (0.96) (0.08)
Constant 0.134 0.074 0.259 0.148 0.182 0.137 0.393 0.340 0.620 0.521 0.135
(1.66)* (1.07) (2.89)*** (1.96)** (2.13)** (1.59) (4.24)*** (3.65)*** (7.17)*** (5.65)*** (1.61)
Underident. test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ident. Test(1) 55.606 55.682 56.255 55.267 51.814 52.386 54.637 55.904 61.480 57.415 56.104
Sargan (p value) 0.487 0.396 0.704 0.148 0.231 0.899 0.282 0.505 0.367 0.773 0.216
Number of obs. 902 901 915 889 889 889 893 933 927 934 930
(1)The reference category is “Being a non-migrant”
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01
The list of instruments includes a dummy variable for whether the individual is the household head and the number of fatalities due to civil or social conflicts in Abidjan for when the individual was 24 years old
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